sted at the time of Mohammed Ali's conquest, and whose
families still exist"; and that an endeavour should be made
to form a confederation of those Sultans. In this view the
Egyptian Government entirely concur. It will of course be
fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be kept
in the Sudan merely with a view to consolidating the powers
of the new rulers of the country. But the Egyptian Government
has the fullest confidence in your judgment, your knowledge
of the country, and your comprehension of the general line of
policy to be pursued. You are therefore given full
discretionary power to retain the troops for such reasonable
period as you may think necessary, in order that the
abandonment of the country may be accomplished with the least
possible risk to life and property. A credit of L100,000 has
been opened for you at the Finance Department[384]. . . .

[Footnote 384: Parl. Papers, Egypt, No. 6 (1884), p. 3.]

In themselves these instructions were not wholly clear. An officer who
is allowed to use troops for the settlement or pacification of a vast
tract of country can hardly be the agent of a policy of mere
"abandonment." Neither Gordon nor Baring seems at that time to have felt
the incongruity of the two sets of duties, but before long it flashed
across Gordon's mind. At Abu Hammed, when nearing Khartum, he
telegraphed to Baring: "I would most earnestly beg that evacuation but
not abandonment be the programme to be followed." Or, as he phrased it,
he wanted Egypt to recognise her "moral control and suzerainty" over the
Sudan[385]. This, of course, was an extension of the programme to which
he gave his assent at Cairo; it differed _toto caelo_ from the policy of
abandonment laid down at London.

[Footnote 385: Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 133.]

Even now it is impossible to see why Ministers did not at once simplify
the situation by a clear statement of their orders to Gordon, not of
course as Governor-General of the Sudan, but as a British officer
charged by them with a definite duty. At a later date they sought to
limit him to the restricted sphere sketched out at London; but then it
was too late to bend to their will a nature which, firm at all times,
was hard as adamant when the voice of conscience spoke within. Already
it had spoken, and against "abandonment."

There were other confusing elements in the situation. Gordon belie