he event of war
it would be better for us that it should be in the hands of a
neutral Power. It is difficult and most expensive to
fortify[435].
[Footnote 434: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 6 (1890).]
[Footnote 435: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, vol. iii.
p. 353. See, too, S. Whitman, _Personal Reminiscences of Prince
Bismarck_, p. 122.]
The passage is instructive as showing the aim of Bismarck's colonial
policy, namely, to wait until England's difficulties were acute (or
perhaps to augment those difficulties, as he certainly did by furthering
Russian schemes against Afghanistan in 1884-85[436]), and then to apply
remorseless pressure at all points where the colonial or commercial
interests of the two countries clashed.
[Footnote 436: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, vol. iii.
pp. 124, 133: also see p. 426 of this work.]
The more his policy is known, the more dangerous to England it is seen
to have been, especially in the years 1884-86. In fact, those persons
who declaim against German colonial ambitions of to-day may be asked to
remember that the extra-European questions recently at issue between
Great Britain and Germany are trivial when compared with the momentous
problems that were peacefully solved by the agreement of the year 1890.
Of what importance are Samoa, Kiao-chow, and the problem of Morocco,
compared with the questions of access to the great lakes of Africa and
the control of the Lower Niger? It would be unfair to Wilhelm II., as
also to the Salisbury Cabinet, not to recognise the statesmanlike
qualities which led to the agreement of July 1, 1890--one of the most
solid gains peacefully achieved for the cause of civilisation throughout
the nineteenth century.
Among its many benefits may be reckoned the virtual settlement of long
and tangled disputes for supremacy in Uganda. We have no space in which
to detail the rivalries of French and British missionaries and agents at
the Court of King M'tesa and his successor M'wanga, or the futile
attempt of Dr. Peters to thrust in German influence. Even the
Anglo-German agreement of 1890 did not end the perplexities of the
situation; for though the British East Africa Company (to which a
charter had been granted in 1888) thenceforth had the chief influence on
the northern shores of Victoria Nyanza, the British Government declined
to assume any direct responsibility for so inaccessible a district.
Thanks, however, t
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