6.]

Earl Granville's advice directly conflicted with Gordon's sense of
honour. As he stated, on or about March 20, the fidelity of the people
of Khartum, while treachery was rife all around, bound him not to leave
them until he could do so "under a Government which would give them some
hope of peace." Here again his duty as Governor of the Sudan, or his
extreme conscientiousness as a man, held him to his post despite the
express recommendations of the British Government. His decision is ever
to be regretted; but it redounds to his honour as a Christian and a
soldier. At bottom, the misunderstanding between him and the Cabinet
rested on a divergent view of duty. Gordon summed up his scruples in his
telegram to Baring:--

You must see that you could not recall me, nor could I possibly obey,
until the Cairo _employes_ get out from all the places. I have named men
to different places, thus involving them with the Mahdi. How could I
look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman,
could you advise this course?

Earl Granville summed up his statement of the case in the words:--

The Mission of General Gordon, as originally designed and decided upon,
was of a pacific nature and in no way involved any movement of British
forces. . . . He was, in addition, authorised and instructed to perform
such other duties as the Egyptian Government might desire to entrust to
him and as might be communicated by you to him. . . . Her Majesty's
Government, bearing in mind the exigencies of the occasion, concurred in
these instructions [those of the Egyptian Government], which virtually
altered General Gordon's Mission from one of advice to that of
executing, or at least directing, the evacuation not only of Khartum but
of the whole Sudan, and they were willing that General Gordon should
receive the very extended powers conferred upon him by the Khedive to
enable him to effect his difficult task. But they have throughout joined
in your anxiety that he should not expose himself to unnecessary
personal risk, or place himself in a position from which retreat would
be difficult[397].

[Footnote 397: Egypt, No. 13 (1884), pp. 5, 6. Earl Granville made the
same statement in his despatch of April 23. See, too, _The Life of Lord
Granville_.]

He then states that it is clear that Khartum can hold out for at least
six months, if it is attacked, and, seeing that the British occupation
of Egypt was only "for a special and te