reement between the three
Emperors imposed the need of caution on a State as isolated and
unpopular as England then was. In view of the designs of the German
colonial party (see Chapter XVII.) and the pressure of the Irish
problem, the Gladstone Cabinet was surely justified in refusing to
undertake any new responsibilities, except on the most urgent need.
Vital interests were at stake in too many places to warrant a policy of
Quixotic adventure up the Nile.

Nevertheless, it is regrettable that Ministers took up on the Sudan
problem a position that was logically sound but futile in the sphere of
action. Gordon's mission, according to Earl Granville, was a peaceful
one, and he inquired anxiously what progress had been made in the
withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons and civilians. This question he
put, even in the teeth of Gordon's positive statement in a telegram of
March 8:--

If you do not send Zebehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons
away; . . . Zebehr here would be far more powerful than the Mahdi, and he
would make short work of the Mahdi[394].

[Footnote 394: _Ibid_. p. 145.]

A week earlier Gordon had closed a telegram with the despairing words:--

I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but I feel conviction I
shall be caught in Khartum[395].

[Footnote 395: _Ibid_. p. 152.]

It is not surprising that Ministers were perplexed by Gordon's
despatches, or that Baring telegraphed to Khartum that he found it very
difficult to understand what the General wanted. All who now peruse his
despatches must have the same feeling, mixed with one of regret that he
ever weakened his case by the proposal to "smash the Mahdi." Thenceforth
the British Government obviously felt some distrust of their envoy; and
in this disturbing factor, and the duality of Gordon's duties, we may
discern one cause at least of the final disaster.

On March 11, the British Government refused either to allow the
appointment of Zebehr, or to send British or Indian troops from Suakim
to Berber. Without wishing to force Gordon's hand prematurely, Earl
Granville urged the need of evacuation at as early a date as might be
practicable. On March 16, after hearing ominous news as to the spread of
the Mahdi's power near to Khartum and Berber, he advised the evacuation
of the former city at the earliest possible date[396]. We may here note
that the rebels began to close round it on March 18.

[Footnote 396: _Ibid_. pp. 158, 162, 16