at England and France had in 1862
agreed to recognise the independence of the Sultan of Zanzibar, the
Germans deemed the field to be clear, and early in November 1884, Dr.
Karl Peters and two other enthusiasts of the colonial party landed at
Zanzibar, disguised as mechanics, with the aim of winning new lands for
their Fatherland. They had with them several blank treaty forms, the
hidden potency of which was soon to be felt by dusky potentates on the
mainland. Before long they succeeded in persuading some of these novices
in diplomacy to set their marks to these documents, an act which
converted them into subjects of the Kaiser, and speedily secured 60,000
square miles for the German tricolour. It is said that the Government of
Berlin either had no knowledge of, or disapproved of, these proceedings;
and, when Earl Granville ventured on some representations respecting
them, he received the reply, dated November 28, 1884, that the Imperial
Government had no design of obtaining a protectorate over Zanzibar[428].
It is difficult to reconcile these statements with the undoubted fact
that on February 17, 1885, the German Emperor gave his sanction to the
proceedings of Dr. Peters by extending his suzerainty over the signatory
chiefs[429]. This event caused soreness among British explorers and
Indian traders who had been the first to open up the country to
civilisation. Nevertheless, the Gladstone Ministry took no effective
steps to safeguard their interests.

[Footnote 427: _The Partition of Africa_, by J. Scott Keltie (1893), pp.
157, 225.]

[Footnote 428: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1886), p. 1.]

[Footnote 429: _Ibid_. pp. 12-20.]

In defence of their academic treatment of this matter some
considerations of a general nature may be urged.

The need of colonies felt by Germany was so natural, so imperious, that
it could not be met by the high and dry legal argument as to the
priority of Great Britain's commercial interests. Such an attitude would
have involved war with Germany about East Africa and war with France
about West Africa, at the very time when we were on the brink of
hostilities with Russia about Merv, and were actually fighting the
Mahdists behind Suakim. The "weary Titan"--to use Matthew Arnold's
picturesque phrase--was then overburdened. The motto, "Live and let
live," was for the time the most reasonable, provided that it was not
interpreted in a weak and maudlin way on essential points.

Many critics, h