urged the despatch of Zebehr
as his "successor," after the withdrawal of troops and civilians from
the Sudan. But, as Sir Evelyn Baring said in forwarding Gordon's request
to Downing Street, it would be most dangerous to place them together at
Khartum. It should further be noted that Gordon's telegrams showed his
belief that the Mahdi's power was overrated, and that his advance in
person on Khartum was most unlikely[388]. It is not surprising, then,
that Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir E. Baring on February 22 that the
public opinion of England "would not tolerate the appointment of Zebehr
Pasha[389]." Already it had been offended by Gordon's proclamation at
Khartum that the Government would not interfere with the buying and
selling of slaves, though, as Sir Evelyn Baring pointed out, the
re-establishment of slavery resulted quite naturally from the policy of
evacuation; and he now strongly urged that Gordon should have "full
liberty of action to complete the execution of his general plans[390]."
[Footnote 388: Egypt, No. 12 (1884), pp. 74, 82, 88.]
[Footnote 389: _Ibid_. p. 95.]
[Footnote 390: _Ibid_. p. 94.]
Here it is desirable to remember that the Mahdist movement was then
confined almost entirely to three chief districts--Kordofan, parts of
the lands adjoining the Blue Nile, and the tribes dwelling west and
south-west of Suakim. For the present these last were the most
dangerous. Already they had overpowered and slaughtered two Egyptian
forces; and on February 22 news reached Cairo of the fall of Tokar
before the valiant swordsmen of Osman Digna. But this was far away from
the Nile and did not endanger Gordon. British troops were landed at
Suakim for the protection of that port, but this step implied no change
of policy respecting the Sudan. The slight impression which two
brilliant but costly victories, those of El Teb and Tamai, made on the
warlike tribes at the back of Suakim certainly showed the need of
caution in pushing a force into the Sudan when the fierce heats of
summer were coming on[391].
[Footnote 391: For details of these battles, see Sir F. Wingate's
_Mahdism_, chap, iii., and _Life of Sir Gerald Graham_ (1901).]
The first hint of any change of policy was made by Gordon in his
despatch of Feb. 26, to Sir E. Baring. After stating his regret at the
refusal of the British Government to allow the despatch of Zebehr as his
successor, he used these remarkable words:--
You must remember th
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