is seen in the following speech of M. Anatole France on February 1,
1905, with respect to his interview with the Premier, M. Combes:--

At the beginning of this war I had heard it said very vaguely
that there existed between France and Russia firm and fast
engagements, and that, if Russia came to blows with a second
Power, France would have to intervene. I asked M. Combes,
then Prime Minister, whether anything of the kind existed. M.
Combes thought it due to his position not to give a precise
answer; but he declared to me in the clearest way that so
long as he was Minister we need not fear that our sailors and
our soldiers would be sent to Japan. My own opinion is that
this folly is not to be apprehended under any Ministry. (_The
Times_. February 3.)

At present, then, everything tends to show that the Franco-Russian
alliance refers solely to European questions and is merely a defensive
agreement in view of a possible attack from one or more members of the
Triple Alliance. Seeing that the purely defensive character of the
latter has always been emphasised, doubts are very naturally expressed
in many quarters as to the use of these alliances. The only tangible
advantage gained by any one of the five Powers is that Russia has had
greater facilities for raising loans in France and in securing her hold
on Manchuria. On the other hand, Frenchmen complain that the alliance
has entailed an immense financial responsibility, which is dearly bought
by the cessation of those irritating frontier incidents of the
Schnaebele type which they had to put up with from Bismarck in the days
of their isolation[275].

[Footnote 275: See an article by Jules Simon in the _Contemporary
Review_, May 1894.]

Italy also questions the wisdom of her alliance with the Central Powers
which brings no obvious return except in the form of slightly enhanced
consideration from her Latin sister. In cultured circles on both sides
of the Maritime Alps there is a strong feeling that the present
international situation violates racial instincts and tradition; and, as
we have already seen, Italy's attitude towards France is far different
now from what it was in 1882. It is now practically certain that
Italians would not allow the King's Government to fight France in the
interests of the Central Powers. Their feelings are quite natural. What
have Italians in common with Austrians and Prussians? Little mo