rant Hebrews, has there acquired the sturdiness, tenacity, and
clannishness that mark the fragments of three nations clustering
together in the Alpine valleys; while it retains the turbulence and
fierceness of a full-blooded Asiatic stock. The Afghan problem is
complicated by these local differences and rivalries; the north cohering
with the Turkomans, Herat and the west having many affinities and
interests in common with Persia, Candahar being influenced by
Baluchistan, while the hill tribes of the north-east bristle with local
peculiarities and aboriginal savagery. These districts can be welded
together only by the will of a great ruler or in the white heat of
religious fanaticism; and while Moslem fury sometimes unites all the
Afghan clans, the Moslem marriage customs result fully as often in a
superfluity of royal heirs, which gives rein to all the forces that make
for disruption. Afghanistan is a hornet's nest; and yet, as we shall see
presently, owing to geographical and strategical reasons, it cannot be
left severely alone. The people are to the last degree clannish; and
nothing but the grinding pressure of two mighty Empires has endowed them
with political solidarity.
It is not surprising that British statesmen long sought to avoid all
responsibility for the internal affairs of such a land. As we have seen,
the theory which found favour with Lord Lawrence was that of intervening
as little as possible in the affairs of States bordering on India, a
policy which was termed "masterly inactivity" by the late Mr. J.W.S.
Wyllie. It was the outcome of the experience gained in the years
1839-42, when, after alienating Dost Mohammed, the Ameer of Afghanistan,
by its coolness, the Indian Government rushed to the other extreme and
invaded the country in order to tear him from the arms of the more
effusive Russians.
The results are well known. Overweening confidence and military
incapacity finally led to the worst disaster that befell a British army
during the nineteenth century, only one officer escaping from among the
4500 troops and 12,000 camp followers who sought to cut their way back
through the Khyber Pass[281]. A policy of non-intervention in the
affairs of so fickle and savage a people naturally ensued, and was
stoutly maintained by Lords Canning, Elgin, and Lawrence, who held sway
during and after the great storm of the Indian Mutiny. The worth of that
theory of conduct came to be tested in 1863, on the occasion
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