ns were secondary to the
two main motives, which at one point converged and begot a haunting fear
(the realisation of which overclouded his last years) that Russia and
France would unite against Germany.
In order, as he thought, to obviate for ever a renewal of the "policy of
Tilsit" of the year 1807, he sought to favour the establishment of the
Republic in France. In his eyes, the more Radical it was the better: and
when Count von Arnim, the German ambassador at Paris, ventured to
contravene his instructions in this matter, he subjected him to severe
reproof and finally to disgrace. However harsh in his methods, Bismarck
was undoubtedly right in substance. The main consideration was that
which he set forth in his letter of December 20, 1872, to the
Count:--"We want France to leave us in peace, and we have to prevent
France finding an ally if she does not keep the peace. As long as France
has no allies she is not dangerous to Germany." A monarchical reaction,
he thought, might lead France to accord with Russia or Austria. A
Republic of the type sought for by Gambetta could never achieve that
task. Better, then, the red flag waving at Paris than the
_fleur-de-lys._
Still more important was it to bring about complete accord between the
three empires. Here again the red spectre proved to be useful. Various
signs seemed to point to socialism as the common enemy of them all. The
doctrines of Bakunin, Herzen, and Lassalle had already begun to work
threateningly in their midst, and Bismarck discreetly used this
community of interest in one particular to bring about an agreement on
matters purely political. In the month of September 1872 he realised one
of his dearest hopes. The Czar, Alexander II., and the Austrian Emperor,
Francis Joseph, visited Berlin, where they were most cordially received.
At that city the chancellors of the three empires exchanged official
memoranda--there seems to have been no formal treaty[242]--whereby they
agreed to work together for the following purposes: the maintenance of
the boundaries recently laid down, the settlement of problems arising
from the Eastern Question, and the repression of revolutionary movements
in Europe.
[Footnote 242: In his speech of February 19, 1878, Bismarck said, "The
_liaison_ of the three Emperors, which is habitually designated an
alliance, rests on no written agreement and does not compel any one of
the three Emperors to submit to the decisions of the two other
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