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tions of the country, which institutions have themselves grown out of local circumstances, the arbitrary authority of some chieftain, or the caprice of the multitude. Secondly, That, although, after allowing for these exceptions, it is admitted that some sorts of actions are more approved than others, the approbation being general, although not universal, yet this may be accounted for, without supposing a moral sense, thus:-- Having experienced a particular line of conduct as beneficial to ourselves, for example, telling the truth, a sentiment of approbation grows up in consequence, and this sentiment thereupon arises whenever the action is mentioned, and without our thinking of the consequences in each instance. The process is illustrated by the love of money, which is strongest in the old, who least of all think of applying it to its uses. By such means, the approval of certain actions is commenced; and being once commenced, the continuance of the feeling is accounted for by authority, by imitation, and by all the usages of good society. As soon as an entire society is possessed of an ethical view, the initiation of the new members is sure and irresistible. The efficacy of Imitation is shown in cases where there is no authority or express training employed, as in the likings and dislikings, or tastes and antipathies, in mere matters of indifference. So much in reply to the alleged uniformity. Next come the positive objections to a Moral Instinct. In the first place, moral rules are not absolutely and universally true; they bend to circumstances. Veracity, which is a natural duty, if there be any such, is dispensed with in case of an enemy, a thief, or a madman. The obligation of promises is released under certain circumstances. In the next place, the Instinct must bear with it the _idea_ of the actions to be approved or disapproved; but we are not born with any such ideas. On the whole, either there exist no moral instincts, or they are undistinguishable from prejudices and habits, and are not to be trusted in moral reasonings. Aristotle held it as self-evident that barbarians are meant to be slaves; so do our modern slave-traders. This instance is one of many to show that the convenience of the parties has much to do with the rise of a moral sentiment. And every system built upon instincts is more likely to find excuses for existing opinions and practices than to reform either. Again: supposing these
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