d resentment. It will err
on the side of lenity, when a mischief is remote and imperceptible.

The author reserves a distinct handling for the Theological principle;
alleging that it falls under one or other of the three foregoing. The
Will of God must mean his will as revealed in the sacred writings,
which, as the labours of divines testify, themselves stand in need of
interpretation. What is meant, in fact, is the _presumptive_ will of
God; that is, what is presumed to be his will on account of its
conformity with another principle. We are pretty sure that what is
right is conformable to his will, but then this requires us first to
know what is right. The usual mode of knowing God's pleasure (he
remarks) is to observe what is our own pleasure, and pronounce that to
be his.

Chapter III.--ON FOUR SANCTIONS OR SOURCES OF PAIN AND PLEASURE whereby
men are stimulated to act right; they are termed, _physical, political,
moral_, and _religious_. These are the Sanctions of Right.

The _physical_ sanction includes the pleasures and pains arising in the
ordinary course of nature, unmodified by the will of any human being,
or of any supernatural being.

The _political_ sanction is what emanates from the sovereign or supreme
ruling power of the state. The punishments of the Law come under this
head.

The _moral_ or _popular_ sanction results from the action of the
community, or of the individuals that each person comes in contact
with, acting without any settled or concerted rule. It corresponds to
public opinion, and extends in its operation beyond the sphere of the
law.

The _religious_ sanction proceeds from the immediate hand of a superior
invisible being, either in the present, or in a future life.

The name Punishment is applicable only to the three last. The suffering
that befalls a man in the course of nature is termed a _calamity_; if
it happen through imprudence on his part, it may be styled a punishment
issuing from the physical sanction.

Chapter IV. is the VALUE OF A LOT OF PLEASURE OR PAIN, HOW TO BE
MEASURED. A pleasure or a pain is determined to be greater or less
according to (1) its _intensity_, (2) its _duration_, (3) its
_certainty_ or _uncertainty_, (4) its _propinquity_ or _remoteness_;
all which are obvious distinctions. To these are to be added (5) its
_fecundity_, or the chance it has of being followed by other sensations
of its own kind; that is pleasures if it be pleasure, pains if it be
pai