ething as a guide to human conduct. In this sense, a man
may set a law to himself, meaning a plan or model, and not a law in the
proper sense of a command. So a _rule_ of art is devoid of a sanction,
and therefore of the idea of duty.

A confusion of ideas also exists as to the meaning of a sanction.
Bentham styles the evils arising in the course of nature _physical_
sanctions, as if the omission to guard against fire were a sin or an
immorality, punished by the destruction of one's house. But although
this is an evil happening to a rational being, and brought on by a
voluntary act or omission, it is not the result of a law in the proper
sense of the term. What is produced _naturally_, says Locke, is
produced _without the intervention of a law_.

Austin is thus seen to be one of the most strenuous advocates of
Utility as the Standard, and is distinguished for the lucidity of his
exposition, and the force of his replies to the objections made against
it.

He is also the best expounder of the relationship of Morality to Law.

WILLIAM WHEWELL. [1794-1866.]

Dr. Whewell's chief Ethical works are, 'Elements of Morality, including
Polity,' and 'Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England.'

We may refer for his views to either work. The following abstract is
taken from the latest (4th) edition of his Elements (1864).

In the Preface he indicates the general scope of the work. Morality has
its root in the Common Nature of Man; a scheme of Morality must conform
to the _Common Sense_ of mankind, in so far as that is consistent with
itself. Now, this Common Sense of Mankind has in every age led to two
seemingly opposite schemes of Morality, the one making _Virtue_, and
the other making _Pleasure_, the rule of action. On the one side, men
urge the claims of Rectitude, Duty, Conscience, the Moral Faculty; on
the other, they declare Utility, Expediency, Interest, Enjoyment, to be
the proper guides.

Both systems are liable to objections. Against the scheme of Pleasure,
it is urged that we never, in fact, identify virtue as merely useful.
Against the scheme of Virtue, it is maintained that virtue is a matter
of opinion, and that Conscience varies in different ages, countries,
and persons. It is necessary that a scheme of Morality should surmount
both classes of objections; and the author therefore attempts a
reconciliation of the two opposing theories.

He prepares the way by asking, whether there are any actions