natural man than
properly belongs to him, to ascribe to him attributes and endowments
which belong only to the social and artificial man. Some
writers--Hutcheson, for example, and he is followed by many others--are
of opinion that man naturally has a conscience or moral sense which
discriminates between right and wrong, just as he has naturally a sense
of taste, which distinguishes between sweet and bitter, and a sense of
sight, which discriminates between red and blue, or a sentient
organism, which distinguishes between pleasure and pain. That man has
by nature, and from the first, the possibility of attaining to a
conscience is not to be denied. That lie has within him by birthright
something out of which conscience is developed, I firmly believe; and
what this is I shall endeavour by-and-by to show when I come to speak
of Sokrates and his philosophy as opposed to the doctrines of the
Sophists. But that the man is furnished by nature with a conscience
ready-made, just as he is furnished with a ready-made sensational
apparatus, this is a doctrine in which I have no faith, and which I
regard as altogether erroneous. It arises out of the disposition to
attribute more to the natural man than properly belongs to him. The
other error into which inquirers are apt to fall in making a
discrimination between what man is by nature, and what he is by
convention, is the opposite of the one just mentioned. They sometimes
attribute to the natural man less than properly belongs to him. And
this, I think, was the error into which the Sophists were betrayed.
They fall into it inadvertently, and not with any design of embracing
or promulgating erroneous opinions.'

2. With reference to SYMPATHY, he differs from Adam Smith's view, that
it is a native and original affection of the heart, like hunger and
thirst. Mere feeling, he contends, can never take a man out of self.
It is thought that overleaps this boundary; not the _feeling_ of
sensation, but the _thought_ of one's self and one's sensations,
gives the ground and the condition of sympathy. Sympathy has
self-consciousness for its foundation. Very young children have little
sympathy, because in them the idea of self is but feebly developed.

3. In his chapter on the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools, he discusses at
length the summum bonum, or Happiness, and, by implication, the Ethical
end, or Standard. He considers that men have to keep in view _two_
ends; the one the maintenance of the