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properly constitutes the Imperative necessary. The Imperative is thus single, and runs: _Act according to that maxim only which you can wish at the same time to become a_ _universal law_. Or, since universality of law as determining effects is what we understand by nature: _Act as if the maxim of your action ought by your will to become the universal law of nature_. Taking cases of duties according to the common divisions of duties to ourselves and to others, perfect and imperfect, he proceeds to show that they may be all deduced from the single Imperative; the question of the _reality_ of duty, which is the same as the establishment of the possibility of the Imperative as a synthetic practical proposition _a priori_, at present altogether apart. Suppose a man tempted to commit suicide, with the view of bettering his evil condition; but it is contradictory that the very principle of self-conservation should lead to self-destruction, and such a maxim of conduct cannot therefore become a universal law of nature. Next, the case of a man borrowing without meaning to repay, has only to be turned into a universal law, and the thing becomes impossible; nobody would lend. Again, to neglect a talent that is generally useful for mere ease and self-gratification, can indeed be supposed a universal practice, but can never be wished to be. Finally, to refuse help to others universally might not ruin the race, but can be wished by no one that knows how soon he must himself need assistance. Now, the rule was, that a maxim of conduct should be _wished_ to become the universal law. In the last two cases, it cannot be wished; in the others, the maxim cannot even be conceived in universal form. Thus, two grades of duty, one admitting of merit, the other so strict as to be irremissible, are established on the general principle. The principle is moreover confirmed in the case of transgression of duty: the transgressor by no means wishes to have his act turned into a general rule, but only seeks special and temporary exemption from a law allowed by himself to be universal. Notwithstanding this force and ease of application, a categorical Imperative has not yet been proved _a priori_ actually existent; and it was allowed that it could not be proved empirically, elements of inclination, interest, &c., being inconsistent with morality. The real question is this: Is it a necessary law that all rational beings should act on maxims that they c
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