nly not
subsist, but would never have been formed. When a struggle does ensue
between passion and self-interest, passion is blind; when between
egoism and the moral determination, egoism is at fault. It is in the
true interest of Passion to be sacrificed to Egoism, and of Egoism to
be sacrificed to Order.

He closes the review of the various moral facts by explaining in what
sense the succession of the three states is to be understood. The state
of Passion is historically first, but the Egoistic and the Moral states
are not so sharply defined. As soon as reason dawns it introduces the
moral motive as well as the egoistic, and to this extent the two states
are contemporaneous. Only, so far is the moral law from being at this
stage fully conceived, that, in the majority of men, it is never
conceived in its full clearness at all. Their confused idea of moral
law is the so-called moral _conscience_, which works more like a sense
or an instinct, and is inferior to the clear rational conception in
everything except that it conveys the full force of obligation. In its
grades of guilt human justice rightly makes allowance for different
degrees of intelligence. The Egoistic determination and the Moral
state, such as it is, once developed, passion is not to be supposed
abolished, but henceforth what really takes place in all is a perpetual
alternation of the various states. Yet though no man is able
exclusively to follow the moral determination, and no man will
constantly be under the influence of any one of the motives, there is
one motive commonly uppermost whereby each can be characterized. Thus
men, according to their habitual conduct, are known as passionate,
egoistic, or virtuous.

We now summarize the opinions of Jouffroy:--

I.--The Standard is the Idea of Absolute Good or Universal Order in the
sense explained by the author. Like Cousin, he identifies the 'good'
with the 'true.' What, then, is the criterion that distinguishes moral
from other truths? If _obligation_ be selected as the _differentia_, it
is in effect to give up the attempt to determine what truths are
obligatory. The idea of 'good' is obviously too vague to be a
_differentia_. How far the idea of 'Universal Order' gets us out of the
difficulty may be doubted, especially after the candid admission of the
author, that it is an idea of which the majority of men have never any
very clear notions.

II.--The moral faculty is Reason; Conscience is hardly mor