sorrow, gratitude, resentment, with so many other passions which are
all supposed to be the subjects of this principle, have made themselves
considerable enough to get titles to know them by, is it not surprising
that the sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so little
heeded; that, a few philosophers excepted, nobody has yet thought it
worth while to bestow a name upon it?']

[Footnote 24: ADAM FERGUSON (1724-1816), is not of sufficient
importance in purely Ethical theory to demand a full abstract. The
following remark on his views is made by Professor Veitch:--'Ferguson,
while holding-with Reid that the notion of Rightness is not resolvable
into utility, or to be derived from sympathy or a moral sense, goes a
step beyond both. Reid and Stewart in the inquiry which he raises
regarding the definite nature and ground of Rightness itself.' The
following is his definition of Moral Good:--'Moral good is the specific
excellence and felicity of human nature, and moral depravity its
specific defect and wretchedness.' The 'excellence' of human nature
consists in four things, drawn out after the analogy of the cardinal
virtues: (1) _Skill_ (Wisdom); (2) _Benevolence_, the principal
excellence of a creature destined to perform a part in social life
(Justice); (3) _Application of mind_ (Temperance); (4) _Force_, or
energy to overcome obstacles (Fortitude). Regarding the _motives_ to
virtue, either virtue is its own reward, or divine rewards and
punishments constitute a sanction; but, in any case, the motive is our
own happiness. All the virtues enumerated are themselves useful or
pleasant, but, over and above, they give rise to an additional
pleasure, when they are made the subject of reflection.]

[Footnote 25: 'The theory which, places the standard of morality in the
_Divine nature_ must not be confounded with that which, places it in
the arbitrary will of God. God did not create morality by his will; it
is inherent in his nature, and co-eternal with himself; nor can he be
conceived as capable of reversing it.' The distinction here drawn does
not avoid the fatal objection to the simpler theory, namely, that it
takes away the moral character of God. The acts of a sovereign cannot,
with, any propriety, as Austin has shown, be termed either legal or
illegal; in like manner, if God is a moral lawgiver, if 'he is
accountable to no one,' then 'his duty and his pleasure are
undistinguishable from each other,' and he cannot w