see Appendix B., Lord Herbert of Cherbury.)]

[Footnote 19: In this respect, Butler differs from both Shaftesbury and
Hutcheson. With Shaftesbury, the main function of the moral sense is to
smile approval on benevolent affections, by which an additional
pleasure is thrown into the scale against the selfish affections. The
superiority of the 'natural affections' thus depends on a double
pleasure, their intrinsically pleasureable character, and the
superadded pleasure of reflection. The tendency of Shaftesbury is here
to make benevolence and virtue identical, and at the same time to
impair the disinterested character of benevolence.]

[Footnote 20: With this view, we may compare the psychology of
Shaftesbury, set forth in his 'Characteristics of Men, Manners, and
Times.' The soul has two kinds of affections--(1) _Self-affection_,
leading to the 'good of the private,' such as love of life, revenge,
pleasure or aptitude towards nourishment and the means of generation,
emulation or love of praise, indolence; and (2) _Natural affections_,
leading to the good of the public. The natural or spontaneous
predominance of benevolence is _goodness_; the subjection of the
selfish by effort and training is _virtue_. Virtue consists generally
in the proper exercise of the several affections.]

[Footnote 21: Butler's definition of conscience, and his whole
treatment of it, have created a great puzzle of classification, as to
whether he is to be placed along with the upholders of a 'moral sense.'
Shaftesbury is more explicit:

'No sooner does the eye open upon figures, the ear to sounds, than
straight the Beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and
acknowledged. No sooner are _actions_ viewed, no sooner the human
affections discerned (and they are, most of them, as soon discerned as
felt), than straight an inward eye distinguishes the _fair_ and
_shapely_, the _amiable_ and _admirable_, apart from the _deformed_,
the _foul_, the _odious_, or the _despicable_' 'In a creature capable
of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which
offer themselves to the sense, are the objects of the affections, but
the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, and
gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by
reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this _reflected
sense_, there arises another kind of affection towards these affections
themselves, which have been already