, or
qualities of actions, universally approved; and whether there are any
moral rules accepted by the Common Sense of mankind as universally
valid? The reply is that there are such, as, for example, the virtues
termed Veracity, Justice, Benevolence. He does not enquire _why_ these
are approved; he accepts the fact of the approval, and considers that
here we have the basis of a Moral System, not liable to either of the
opposing objections above recited.
He supposes, however, that the alleged agreement may be challenged,
_first_, as not existing; and _next_, as insufficient to reason from.
1. It may be maintained that the excellence of the three virtues named
is not universally assented to; departures from them being allowed both
in practice and in theory. The answer is, that the principles may be
admitted, although the interpretation varies. Men allow Fidelity and
Kindness to be virtues, although in an early stage of moral progress
they do not make the application beyond their own friends; it is only
at an advanced stage that they include enemies. The Romans at first
held stranger and enemy to be synonymous; but afterwards they applauded
the sentiment of the poet, _homo sum_, &c. Moral principles must be
what we approve of, when we speak in the name of the whole human
species.
2. It may be said that such principles are too vague and loose to
reason from. A verbal agreement in employing the terms _truthful, just,
humane_, does not prove a real agreement as to the actions; and the
particulars must be held as explaining the generalities.
The author holds this objection to be erroneous; and the scheme of his
work is intended to meet it. He proceeds as follows:--
He allows that we must fix what is meant by _right_, which carries with
it the meaning of Virtue and of Duty. Now, in saying an action is
right, there is this idea conveyed, namely, that we render such a
_reason_ for it, as shall be _paramount_ to all other considerations.
Right must be the _Supreme_ Rule. How then are we to arrive at this
rule?
The supreme rule is the authority over _all_ the faculties and
impulses; and is made up of the partial rules according to the separate
faculties, powers, and impulses. We are to look, in the first instance,
to the several faculties or departments of the mind; for, in connexion
with each of these, we shall find an irresistible propriety inherent in
the very nature of the faculty.
For example, man lives in the
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