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, or qualities of actions, universally approved; and whether there are any moral rules accepted by the Common Sense of mankind as universally valid? The reply is that there are such, as, for example, the virtues termed Veracity, Justice, Benevolence. He does not enquire _why_ these are approved; he accepts the fact of the approval, and considers that here we have the basis of a Moral System, not liable to either of the opposing objections above recited. He supposes, however, that the alleged agreement may be challenged, _first_, as not existing; and _next_, as insufficient to reason from. 1. It may be maintained that the excellence of the three virtues named is not universally assented to; departures from them being allowed both in practice and in theory. The answer is, that the principles may be admitted, although the interpretation varies. Men allow Fidelity and Kindness to be virtues, although in an early stage of moral progress they do not make the application beyond their own friends; it is only at an advanced stage that they include enemies. The Romans at first held stranger and enemy to be synonymous; but afterwards they applauded the sentiment of the poet, _homo sum_, &c. Moral principles must be what we approve of, when we speak in the name of the whole human species. 2. It may be said that such principles are too vague and loose to reason from. A verbal agreement in employing the terms _truthful, just, humane_, does not prove a real agreement as to the actions; and the particulars must be held as explaining the generalities. The author holds this objection to be erroneous; and the scheme of his work is intended to meet it. He proceeds as follows:-- He allows that we must fix what is meant by _right_, which carries with it the meaning of Virtue and of Duty. Now, in saying an action is right, there is this idea conveyed, namely, that we render such a _reason_ for it, as shall be _paramount_ to all other considerations. Right must be the _Supreme_ Rule. How then are we to arrive at this rule? The supreme rule is the authority over _all_ the faculties and impulses; and is made up of the partial rules according to the separate faculties, powers, and impulses. We are to look, in the first instance, to the several faculties or departments of the mind; for, in connexion with each of these, we shall find an irresistible propriety inherent in the very nature of the faculty. For example, man lives in the
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