ith great severity on Mackintosh's doctrines, as to the
delight of virtue for its own sake, and the special contact of moral
feelings with the will. Allowance being made for the great difference
in the way that the two writers express themselves, they are at one in
maintaining Utility to be the ultimate standard, and in regarding
Conscience as a derived faculty of the mind.

The author's handling of Ethics does not extend beyond the first and
second topics--the STANDARD and the FACULTY. His Standard is Utility.
The Faculty is based on our Pleasures and Pains, with which there are
multiplied associations. Disinterested Sentiment is a real fact, but
has its origin in our own proper pleasures and pains.

Mill considers that the existing moral rules are all based on our
estimate, correct or incorrect, of Utility.

JOHN AUSTIN. [1790-1859.]

Austin, in his Lectures on 'The Province of Jurisprudence determined,'
has discussed the leading questions of Ethics. We give an abstract of
the Ethical part.

LECTURE I. Law, in its largest meaning, and omitting metaphorical
applications, embraces Laws set by God to his creatures, and Laws set
by man to man. Of the laws set by man to man, some are established by
_political_ superiors, or by persons exercising government in nations
or political societies. This is law in the usual sense of the word,
forming the subject of Jurisprudence. The author terms it _Positive
Law_. There is another class of laws not set by political superiors in
that capacity. Yet some of these are properly termed laws, although
others are only so by a close Analogy. There is no name for the laws
proper, but to the others are applied such names as '_moral_ rules,'
'the _moral_ law,' '_general_ or _public opinion_,' 'the law of
_honour_ or of _fashion_.' The author proposes for these laws the name
_positive morality_. The laws now enumerated differ in many important
respects, but agree in this--that all of them are set _by_ intelligent
and rational beings _to_ intelligent and rational beings. There is a
figurative application of the word 'law,' to the uniformities of the
natural world, through which, the field of jurisprudence and morals has
been deluged with muddy speculation.

Laws properly so called are _commands_. A command is the signification
of a desire or wish, accompanied with the power and the purpose to
inflict evil if that desire is not complied with. The person so desired
is _bound_ or _obliged_,