ness or good of mankind.
The most specious objection to Utility is the supposed necessity of
going through a calculation of the consequences of every act that we
have to perform, an operation often beyond our power, and likely to be
abused to forward our private wishes. To this, the author replies
first, that supposing utility our only index, we must make the best of
it. Of course, if we were endowed with a moral sense, a special organ
for ascertaining our duties, the attempt to displace that invincible
consciousness, and to thrust the principle of utility into the vacant
seat, would be impossible and absurd.
According to the theory of Utility, our conduct would conform to
_rules_ inferred from the tendencies of actions, but would not be
determined by a direct resort to the principle of general utility.
Utility would be the ultimate, not the immediate test. To preface each
act or forbearance by a conjecture and comparison of consequences were
both superfluous and mischievous:--superfluous, inasmuch as the result
is already embodied in a known rule; and mischievous, inasmuch as the
process, if performed on the spur of the occasion, would probably be
faulty.
With the rules are associated _sentiments_, the result of the Divine,
or other, command to obey the rules. It is a gross and flagrant error
to talk of _substituting_ calculation for sentiment; this is to oppose
the rudder to the sail. Sentiment without calculation were capricious;
calculation without sentiment is inert.
There are cases where the _specific_ consequences of an action are so
momentous as to overbear the rule; for example, resistance to a bad
government, which the author calls an _anomalous_ question, to be tried
not by the rule, but by a direct resort to the ultimate or
presiding-principle, and by a separate calculation of good and evil.
Such was the political emergency of the Commonwealth, and the American
revolution. It would have been well, the author thinks, if utility had
been the sole guide in both cases.
There is a second objection to Utility, more perplexing to deal with.
How can we know fully and correctly all the consequences of actions?
The answer is that Ethics, as a science of observation and induction,
has been formed, through a long succession of ages, by many and
separate contributions from many and separate discoverers. Like all
other sciences, it is progressive, although unfortunately, subject to
special drawbacks. The men th
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