ociation composed of the idea of a man and of his pains,
are both Affections included under one name Kindness; although in the
second case it has the more specific name Compassion.

Under the other heads, the author's elucidation is fuller, but his
principle is the same.

He next goes on (XXII.) to MOTIVES. When the idea of a Pleasure is
associated with an action of our own as the cause, that peculiar state
of mind is generated, called a motive. The idea of the pleasure,
without the idea of an action for gaining it, does not amount to a
motive. Every pleasure may become a motive, but every motive does not
end in action, because there may be counter-motives; and the strength
attained by motives depends greatly on education. The facility of being
acted on by motives of a particular kind is a DISPOSITION. We have, in
connexion with all our leading pleasures and pains, names indicating
their motive efficacy. Gluttony is both motive and disposition; so Lust
and Drunkenness; with the added sense of reprobation in all the three.
Friendship is a name for Affection, Motive, and Disposition.

In Chapter XXIII., the author makes the application of his principles
to Ethics. The actions emanating from ourselves, combined with those
emanating from our fellow-creatures, exceed all other Causes of our
Pleasures and Pains. Consequently such actions are objects of intense
affections or regards.

The actions whence advantages accrue are classed under the four titles,
Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Benevolence. The two first--Prudence and
Fortitude [in fact, Prudence]--express acts useful to ourselves in the
first instance, to others in the second instance. Justice and
Benevolence express acts useful to others in the first instance, to
ourselves in the second instance. We have two sets of association with
all these acts, one set with them as our own, another set with them as
other people's. With Prudence (and Fortitude) as our own acts, we
associate good to ourselves, either in the shape of positive pleasure,
or as warding off pain. Thus Labour is raised to importance by numerous
associations of both classes. Farther, Prudence, involving the
foresight of a train of consequences, requires a large measure of
knowledge of things animate and inanimate. Courage is defined by the
author, incurring the chance of Evil, that is danger, for the sake of a
preponderant good; which, too, stands in need of knowledge. Now, when
the ideas of acts of Pr