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ance on him at this time with strong reasonable chances of fighting a great and successful battle? 2. Is an advance of our army likely to prevent additional reinforcements being sent against General Grant by Bragg? 3. Is an immediate or early advance of our army advisable? [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 395.] With substantial unanimity they answered that it was not advisable to move, though they seem generally to have been aware that Breckinridge with about 10,000 men of all arms had gone from Bragg to Johnston. When Rosecrans reported the result of this council to Halleck, the latter reminded him of the maxim that "councils of war never fight," and that the responsibility for his campaign rests upon a commanding general and cannot be shared by a council of war. The careful study of the correspondence elicited by Rosecrans's circular would make a most valuable commentary upon the theme, "_Why_ Councils of War never fight." The three questions were addressed to sixteen general officers commanding corps and divisions. [Footnote: Their answers are found in Official Records, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. as follows: Davis, p. 395, Johnson, do., McCook, 396, Turchin, 397, Brannan, 402, Crittenden, 403, Granger, 403, Wood, 405, Negley, 407, Palmer, do., Reynolds, 409, Rousseau, 410, Sheridan, 411, Stanley, 412, Thomas, 414, Van Cleve, 415, Mitchell, 417, and Garfield's summing up, 420.] In reading the responses the impression grows strong that there was what may be called a popular feeling among these officers that their duty was to back up their commanding general in a judgment of his on the subjects submitted, which could hardly be other than well known. On the question as to the probable reduction of Bragg's army by detachments sent to Johnston, whilst they nearly all have some knowledge of the diminution of the Confederate army to about the extent mentioned above, most of them answer that they do not think it a _material_ weakening, that being the tenor of the inquiry put to them. Some of them, however, say very naturally that as the secret service is managed from headquarters and all the information received is forwarded there, General Rosecrans should be much better able to answer this question than his subordinates. As to the second part of that question, nearly all seem to assume that the battle would be in the nature of a direct attack on the fortifications at Shelbyville and are not sanguine of a
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