him here
with his reinforcements." In conclusion he indicated the necessity
of 6000 more cavalry to be added to the army. [Footnote: See also
_ante_, p. 478.]
When the answers were all received, Garfield summed them up in a
paper, which must be admitted to be a remarkable production for a
young volunteer officer deliberately controverting the opinions of
such an array of seniors. He gave, as the best information at
headquarters, the force of Bragg, before sending help to Johnston,
as 38,000 infantry, 2600 artillery, and 17,500 cavalry. This made
the infantry about 1000 too many, the artillery nearly exactly
right, and the cavalry 2500 too many,--on the whole a very close
estimate. From these he deducted 10,000, which was right. He stated
Rosecrans's force at 82,700 "bayonets and sabres" with about 3000
more on the way, but deducted 15,000 for necessary posts and
garrisons. The balancing showed 65,000 to throw against Bragg's
41,500. He further showed that delay would give time for the enemy's
detachments to return, whilst we could hope for no further increase
during the rest of the season. He then analyzed the military and
civil reasons for activity, declared that he believed we could be
victorious, and that the administration and the country had the
right to expect the army to try.
The result was a curious but encouraging result of bold and cogent
reasoning. Although Rosecrans reported to General Halleck on the
11th of June the opinion of his corps and division commanders
against an early advance, the logic and the facts pressed upon him
by his chief of staff evidently took strong hold of his active
intellect, so that when Halleck on the 16th asked for a categorical
answer whether he would make an immediate movement forward, he
replied, "If it means to-night or to-morrow, no. If it means as soon
as all things are ready, say five days, yes." [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxiii. pt. i. pp. 8-10.] No doubt the rather plain
intimation that a categorical "no" would be followed by action at
Washington helped the decision; but it would have helped it to a
decided negative if Garfield's paper, reinforced by the personal
advice and oral discussions which we now know were of daily
occurrence between them, had not had a convincing weight with him,
both as to the feasibility of the campaign of turning manoeuvres
which he devised and adopted, and as to its probable success. The
result is reckoned one of his chief claims
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