ry orders to begin an active advance, these orders were
interpreted in the light of the preceding correspondence, and lost
their force and vigor. They were met by querulous and insubordinate
inquiries whether they were intended to take away all discretion as
to details from the commander of an army in the field. [Footnote:
Aug. 4, _Id_., p. 592.] It has been argued that Rosecrans's weakness
of character consisted in a disposition to quarrel with those in
power over him, and that a spirit of contradiction thwarted the good
military conduct which his natural energy might have produced. I
cannot help reading his controversial correspondence in the light of
my personal observation of the man, and my conviction is that his
quarrelsome mode of dealing with the War Department was the result
of a real weakness of will and purpose which did not take naturally
to an aggressive campaign that involved great responsibilities and
risks. Being really indecisive in fixing his plan of campaign and
acting upon it, his infirmity of will was covered by a belligerence
in his correspondence. A really enterprising commander in the field
would have begun an active campaign in the spring before any
dissatisfaction was exhibited at Washington; and if he had a decided
purpose to advance at any reasonably early period, there was nothing
in the urgency shown by his superiors to make him abandon his
purpose. He might have made testy comments, but he would have acted.

Halleck's correspondence with Burnside in July is hard to
understand, unless we assume that it was so perfunctory that he did
not remember at one time what he said or did earlier. In a dispatch
to the General-in-Chief dated the 11th, Rosecrans had said, "It is
important to know if it will be practicable for Burnside to come in
on our left flank and hold the line of the Cumberland; if not, a
line in advance of it and east of us." [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 529.] It was already understood between
Rosecrans and Burnside that the latter would do this and more as
soon as he should have the Ninth Corps with him; and the dispatch
must be regarded as a variation on the form of excuses for inaction,
by suggesting that he was delayed by the lack of an understanding as
to co-operation by the Army of the Ohio. On receipt of Rosecrans's
dispatch, Halleck answered it on the 13th, saying, "General Burnside
has been frequently urged to move forward and cover your left by
ente