for the long roads
over the mountains would be practically impassable in winter. The
route from Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap was the shortest, and,
on the whole, the easiest, and a great system of transportation by
trains under escort was put in operation. The camp at Cumberland Gap
could give this protection through the mountain district, and made a
convenient stopping-place in the weary way when teams broke down or
had to be replaced. Other roads were also used whilst they seemed to
be safe, and the energies and resources of the quartermaster's
department were strained to the utmost to bring forward arms,
ammunition for cannon and muskets, food and medical supplies, and
all the munitions of war. The roads were covered with herds of
beeves and swine, and feeding stations for these were established
and the forage had to be drawn to them, for nothing could be got,
along the greater part of the route. Burnside hoped that the railway
by Chattanooga would be put in repair and be open before winter
should shut in, but he very prudently acted on the principle of
making the most of his present means. It was well he did so, for
otherwise his little army would have been starved before the winter
was half over.

From Cumberland Gap the courier line was sixty miles shorter than
from Knoxville, and the first dispatches of Burnside announcing his
capture of Frazer's troops reached Washington more quickly than
later ones. At noon of the 11th Mr. Lincoln answered it with hearty
congratulations and thanks. This was quickly followed by a
congratulatory message from Halleck accompanied by formal orders.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 555.] These last
only recapitulated the points in Burnside's further operations and
administration which were the simplest deductions from the
situation. Burnside was to hold the country eastward to the gaps of
the North Carolina mountains (the Great Smokies) and the valley of
the Holston up to the Virginia line. Halleck used the phrase "the
line of the Holston," which would be absurd, and was probably only a
slip of the pen. The exact strength of General Jones, the
Confederate commander in southwestern Virginia, was not known, but,
to preserve his preponderance, Burnside could not prudently send
less than a division of infantry and a couple of brigades of cavalry
to the vicinity of Rogersville or Greeneville and the railroad
crossing of the Watauga. This would be just about half h