he numerical returns be made "on the forms furnished and
according to the directions expressed on them" (General Orders No.
64, Sept. 8, 1862). The column "Effective Total" in these returns
included only enlisted men carrying arms and actually in the line of
battle. It excluded all officers, the non-commissioned staff,
extra-duty men, the sick in hospital, and those in arrest. To secure
uniformity in the method of reporting in his army and to correct
some irregularity, General Bragg issued a circular, as follows
(Official Records, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 619):--

[Circular.]

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
TULLAHOMA, January 29, 1863.

Hereafter, under the column of 'Effective Total' in the reports from
this army, extra-duty men and men in arrest will not be included.
The 'Effective Total' must include only the fighting field
force--those who are carried into the field of battle with fire-arms
in their hands.

By command of General Bragg.
GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General."

Before the publication of the Official Records, I had occasion to
call attention to the subject: see "The Nation," May 21, 1874, p.
334; also "Atlanta" (Scribners' Series), pp. 27, 28; and again in
"The Nation," February 2, 1893, p. 86. A fair comparison between the
Confederate and the National armies, therefore, demands a
computation of numbers by the same method; and as we did not use
forms containing the "Effective Total" as reported by the
Confederates, the columns of officers and men "present for duty"
which are computed alike in the returns on both sides are the most
satisfactory and fair basis of comparison.] He did not think Bragg
would fight, but would retreat, and thought that in such a case he
would not be hindered from sending more help to Johnston. Again, as
forage in the country was scarce, he voted against an early advance.

Thomas did not believe Bragg had been materially weakened, for if
any troops had been sent away, he thought they had returned or their
places had been supplied. He concluded that Bragg was ready to fight
with an army at least as large as that of Rosecrans; that to hold
our army where it was would sufficiently prevent further reduction
of Bragg's; that an advance would give the latter the advantage and
was not advisable. His preference for defensive warfare was very
evident. He said it was true that Bragg might be reinforced and take
the initiative, but that he "should be most happy to meet