successful result. The few who speak of
turning manoeuvres feel that the further retreat of Bragg would only
lengthen their own line of communications and do no good. Strangely,
too, they argue, many of them, that an advance would not prevent
further depletion of Bragg to strengthen Johnston. They consequently
and almost unanimously advise against an immediate or early advance.
It is instructive to compare these opinions with the actual facts.
The inaction of the summer had led directly to the detachment of two
divisions of infantry and artillery and one of cavalry to reinforce
Johnston, just as the inactivity of Meade later in the season
encouraged the Richmond government to send Longstreet to Bragg from
Virginia. If Rosecrans had moved early in the season, not only must
Bragg have kept his army intact, but the battle of Chickamauga, if
fought at all, must have been decided without Longstreet, and
therefore most probably with brilliant success for our arms. It was
delay in advancing, both in Tennessee and in Virginia, that thus
directly led to disaster. If a brilliant victory at Chickamauga had
been coincident with the fall of Vicksburg and Lee's defeat at
Gettysburg, it does not seem rash to believe that the collapse of
the Confederacy would have been hastened by a year.
Two of the generals who answered these questions attained afterward
to such distinction that their replies are an interesting means of
learning their mental character and gauging their development.
Sheridan answered briefly that he believed Bragg had no more than
25,000 or 30,000 infantry and artillery, with a "large" cavalry
force. In this he was very close to the mark. Bragg's report for the
latter part of May, before sending reinforcements to Johnston,
showed his forces present for duty to be 37,000 infantry, a little
less than 3000 artillery, and 15,000 cavalry, in round numbers.
Deduct 10,000 from these, and Sheridan is found to be sufficiently
accurate. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. p. 846.
The reference to Bragg's returns of strength to the
Adjutant-General's office makes this an appropriate place to note
the method of making these returns and its bearing on the much
debated question of the "Effective Total" commonly given by
Confederate writers as the force of their armies compared with ours.
The blanks for these reports were sent out from the
Adjutant-and-Inspector-General's office at Richmond, with the order
that t
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