he said, "If I had 6000 cavalry
in addition to the mounting of the 2000 now waiting horses, I would
attack Bragg within three days." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 351.] He also
interposed the unfavorable judgment of his corps commanders in
regard to an advance. Military history shows that this is pretty
uniformly an excuse for a delay already fully resolved on by a
commanding general. Halleck had no more cavalry to send, and could
only say so. Burnside notified Rosecrans on the 22d that his columns
had begun the movements of concentration and that they would be
complete in three or four days. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxiii. pt. ii. p. 355.] On the 28th Mr. Lincoln himself telegraphed
Rosecrans, "I would not push you to any rashness, but I am very
anxious that you do your utmost, short of rashness, to keep Bragg
from getting off to help Johnston against Grant." [Footnote: _Id_.,
p. 369.] Rosecrans curtly answered, "Dispatch received. I will
attend to it." In his dispatches to Mr. Stanton of similar date
there is no intimation of any purpose whatever to move. [Footnote:
_Ibid_.] In telegraphing to Burnside, Rosecrans said that he was
only waiting for the development of the former's concentration, and
that he wished to advance by the 4th of June. [Footnote: _Id_., pp.
372, 376.] Burnside had already informed him that he would be ready
by June 2d, and repeated it. On the date last named Rosecrans
telegraphed Burnside that his movement had already begun, and that
he wanted the Army of the Ohio to come up as near and as quickly as
possible. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 381.] Still he gave no intimation to
the authorities at Washington of an advance, for none had in fact
been made by his army, nor even of any near purpose to make one. On
June 3d, Halleck telegraphed him: "Accounts received here indicate
that Johnston is being heavily reinforced from Bragg's army. If you
cannot hurt the enemy now, he will soon hurt you." He followed this
by his dispatch to Burnside ordering reinforcements to be sent to
Grant, and the remainder of the troops in the Department of the Ohio
to be concentrated defensively in Kentucky. [Footnote: _Id_., pp.
383, 384.] The only move that Rosecrans made was to send on the 8th
to his general officers commanding corps and divisions, a
confidential circular asking their opinion in writing in answer to
the following questions, in substance,--

1. Has the enemy been so materially weakened that this army could
adv