majority of his soldiers either went over to the enemy or fled
in headlong flight to Karashar. In this moment of desperation the
Athalik Ghazi still bore himself like a good soldier. Outside Turfan he
gave battle to the invader, and though driven from the field by
overwhelming odds he yet once more made a stand at Toksoun, forty miles
west of Turfan, and when a second time defeated withdrew to Karashar to
make fresh efforts to withstand the invading army. Yakoob Beg probably
lost in these engagements not less than 20,000 men, including Tungani,
by desertion and at the hands of the enemy. He consequently conceived
that it would be prudent to withdraw still farther into his territory,
and accordingly left Karashar, after a few days' residence, for Korla.

Some weeks before the occurrence of these striking events Yakoob Beg had
sent an envoy to Tashkent to solicit the aid of the Russians against the
advancing Chinese. But the Russians only gave his messenger fair words,
and did not interfere with Mr. Kamensky's commercial transactions with
the Chinese army. At the moment, too, Russia was so busily occupied in
Europe that she had no leisure to devote to the Kashgarian question.

The Chinese had for many years been good friends with Russia, and Yakoob
Beg had all his life been a scarcely concealed enemy. Between two such
combatants the sympathies of the Russian government must at first have
certainly gone with the former; nor had Yakoob Beg's attitude towards
Russia of late been as discreet as it might have been. His nephew, the
Seyyid Yakoob Khan, was notoriously an agent for some indefinite purpose
at Constantinople. His protection of the Bokharan prince, Abdul Melik,
or Katti Torah, the most bitter enemy of Russia in Central Asia, was
also ill calculated to attract Russian sympathy to his side.

Moreover there was little or nothing to arouse Russian susceptibilities
in Chinese victories so far distant as Urumtsi or Turfan. In many
respects, too, this Chinese invasion was a relief for Russia. It freed
her hands in Central Asia in a manner that perhaps will never be
sufficiently appreciated. Buddhist victories in Eastern Turkestan struck
a severe blow at Mahomedan vigour throughout the Khanates, and the
waning prestige of the Badaulet, or the "fortunate one," acted as a
warning of strange significance to all the neighbouring princes.

It is not difficult, therefore, to discover valid reasons why the
Russians declined to