to atone for it
in so far as we are able by an ample recognition of the change in
affairs north of the Karakoram?

The Che-foo Convention gave us the right to send an embassy to Tibet, on
the condition that it should be acted upon within a given space. We did
not avail ourselves of that concession, and the Chinese, we are
informed, consider that the right has lapsed. We may have been wise or
we may have been foolish--in my opinion we have been foolish--in
declining to enforce the only real concession China made, in reparation
for the murder of Mr. Margary. Does this concession, which we never made
use of, entitle us to send a mission to the Chinese in Kashgar? Acting
upon this precedent, are we justified in supposing that the Chinese
would hold out a hand of friendship to an English envoy coming from Leh
to Yarkand? It is much to be feared that it would not. At the present
moment, too, the country must be in such a disturbed state, that the
Chinese would have a ready excuse if any accident befel our envoy.
Moreover, at the present moment an envoy would have no definite object
before him. A few years hence, when the Chinese rule shall be completely
restored throughout Eastern Turkestan, it may be reasonable to expect a
revival of trade in this direction; but at present it would be premature
to agitate for it. Nor would a simple embassy of congratulation look
well. We have too recently befriended the Athalik Ghazi to make our
congratulations to his conqueror anything but a mockery. The Chinese
would be puffed up with vanity, and think that we were only worshipping
their rising sun. Whatever action we do take in Central Asia, to effect
an understanding with the Chinese, we must be very careful that it has
been well considered, and that it is as cautious as it must be clearly
defined. Any mistake would be simply fatal to the preservation of good
relations with China. Therefore, we must do nothing. _Quieta non movere_
must be our motto, and we must only look forward to some auspicious
occasion when it may be possible to enter into cordial relations with
China.

But, although our hands are tied in Central Asia, they are not fettered
at Pekin, and we certainly should congratulate, if we have not done so
already, the Chinese on their remarkable successes in the Tian Shan
regions. That step might be pregnant with beneficent results, and our
desire to be on good terms with our new, yet our old, neighbour might be
met in a cordi