ernoe, or engage in a war out of which, on his own resources alone, it
will be impossible for him to issue victorious. If Russia interfere
openly in defence of Shere Ali, Kuldja must be restored to the Chinese,
otherwise Russia's flank would be exposed to a crushing blow, which the
Chinese would not be slow to take advantage of. Present events on the
Ili and on the Cabul have, therefore, this much in common, that they
both aim, directly or indirectly, at the fabric of Russian supremacy in
Central Asia. The occupation of Afghanistan by England, or even a
partial occupation of it as is very probable, would seriously weaken
Russian prestige in Western Turkestan. A Chinese occupation of Kuldja
would undermine her position in Vernoe and Naryn and among the Kirghiz.
Admitting these, is it not natural to suppose that in each case Russia
will fight, or that, even if she does not fight in each case, she will
fight in the one that she may deem of the most importance? But we need
not pursue the subject farther. The Chinese are face to face with Russia
in the heart of Central Asia, just as a few short months ago they were
opposed to Yakoob Beg and the power of the Tungani.
Their army is drawn up in hostile array; it is each day becoming more
numerous and more perfectly prepared. Its generals are the same who have
led it to constant victory; its main body is the veterans of three
campaigns. The Chinese are persuaded, and it is impossible to say not
justly persuaded, of the righteousness of their cause. The Russians can
have no equal confidence either in their strength, or in their moral
position. They are not exactly championing a bad cause, or a lost one,
but, in comparison to the Chinese, they have no legal position. It
remains to be seen whether by force of arms, or by diplomatic
superiority, they can make up for the flaw in their tenure of Kuldja.
Farther on, in the vista of the events yet to come, there looms the
prospect of an Anglo-Chinese alliance, that must be most beneficial to
the peoples of Asia generally. But, before it will be possible for
Englishmen to count upon the presence of the Chinese as a favourable
"factor in the Central Asian question," our relations with China must be
placed upon a firmer and a more friendly basis than any which has yet
existed. We have it in our power to do this, and the ever-widening
breach between Russia and China simplifies our task in no slight degree.
The day will come when Russia will
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