al manner by the Chinese. The Chinese will not stoop to
propitiate us in order to preserve their rule in Eastern Turkestan; but
it is against common sense to suppose that they will be eager to embroil
themselves with us at the same moment that they are quarrelling with the
Russians. The Kuldja question must throw China into our alliance, if we
are not precipitate, and do not offer her any slight by meddling with
this semi-independent chief of Khoten, who is said to have overthrown a
Chinese detachment. And, in negotiating with the rulers of Kashgaria, we
must remember that commercial advantages are all very well, but that
political are infinitely more important. It has been tersely said that
we patronized Yakoob Beg in order to make a market for Kangra tea; but
the very trivial advantages we secured in a commercial sense were far
more than counterbalanced by the political disadvantages we derived from
a recognition of the Athalik Ghazi. In dealing with the Chinese we must
not set before us, as our guiding star, the privilege of supplying the
good people of Kashgar and Yarkand with tea and other necessaries. What
we aspire to is to be on terms of amity with China, as a power in
Central Asia, which will possess everything it desires when Ili has
been restored, and which most accordingly be inclined to resent with us
the undue aggrandizement of Russia. These are the future advantages that
may accrue from an understanding between England and China. But at the
present juncture there are others similar in kind, but immediate in
effect. The Afghan question, which now clamours for solution, and which
will scarcely pass through this crisis without finding our hold on Cabul
made more assured, is in many respects connected with the Kuldja.

In each case the ambition of Russia is the motive power, and in each she
seeks to play her game with as little risk, and as much gain, as
possible. In neither will she fight, if she can avoid the necessity, yet
in each there is a point beyond which her honour and her interests alike
refuse to permit her to remain concealed and neutral. The solution of
the two questions is being worked out simultaneously, and the progress
of the Afghan question will at least very seriously affect the later
stages of the Kuldja. If Russia has to fight to defend Shere Ali, then
we may be sure that Tso Tsung Tang's legions will not remain inactive,
and that General Kolpakovsky will either have to beat a retreat to
V