n Tibet and Yunnan towards us exists
in Kashgaria also; and that feeling is a veiled hostility. Therefore,
while the Chinese are beginning to regard Russia with the hostile
feelings that once were reserved for England, they have by no means
altered their old sentiments towards us. We have done nothing whatever
to induce them to do so. We have not helped them in any way to regain
Kashgar, and on the whole English opinion may be said to have been more
adverse to, than in favour of, their claims. They have found in the
arsenals of Kashgar and Yarkand many proofs of England's alliance with,
and friendship for, Yakoob Beg; and, on the other hand, they certainly
owe much to the assistance of Russian merchants, and the forbearance of
the Russian government. Nor should we for an instant delude ourselves
with the fallacy that the Chinese will look to us for aid against
Russia, as Yakoob Beg did. They have conquered Eastern Turkestan without
us--in fact, despite of our moral opposition; and they will retain it if
they can by their own right arms. It will not enter their head for an
instant to play the old game of Yakoob Beg, of setting England off
against Russia. But, although they will play a perfectly independent
game, it by no means follows that they will be hostile to this country,
if by some fortunate stroke of diplomacy we could bring home to their
minds the fact that England is glad at the result of the war in Central
Asia, however much she may have failed during its progress to recognize
which was the rightful cause. But what is that fortunate stroke of
diplomacy to be? and how is it to be brought to pass? To each of these
questions it would be rash to give any confident reply. In dealing with
the Chinese we are not only treating with a people whom we very
imperfectly understand, but also with a government the secret springs of
whose policy we neither know nor appreciate. The action we might
therefore adopt, founded though it should be on the experience of some
Englishman versed in the mysteries of China, might fail to accomplish
what it seemed calculated to secure. It might be crowned with success,
it might be condemned with failure. Of course the first thing to decide
is, how are we to take official cognizance of China's reconquest of
Kashgaria, and how are we to bring home to the minds of Tso Tsung Tang
and his lieutenants the knowledge that we have repented of our
shortsighted policy towards Yakoob Beg, and are willing