but
there might have been, for fresh purposes, a Russo-Chinese alliance in
Central Asia. That alliance must have been fraught with danger to this
country, and for reasons that will best be described under the head of
Anglo-Chinese relations.
But the Russian authorities failed to grasp the situation in its full
extent. They treated the Kuldja question as a mere local affair, and
they trifled with the Chinese as if the latter had no very strong
interest in the matter. They altogether ignored the terrible earnestness
of the Chinese character, and they treated the demands of Tso Tsung Tang
in a spirit of levity that must have roused the ire of that general.
Their policy, regarded from any point of view, was shallow and unwise,
but, bearing in mind the past tact and diplomatic skill shown by Russia
in her dealings with China, it must appear more shallow and foolish. Of
course this Kuldja question differs from all previous questions in the
essential point of all, that here for the first time Russia had to go
back instead of advancing, as always had been the case heretofore. The
Russian authorities simply regarded the matter from the point of view
of what effect it would have upon the peoples of Central Asia. They
persuaded themselves that to hand over Kuldja would be to give an
impetus to every hostile element in Western Turkestan, as well as to
lower their prestige generally throughout Asia. As a leading Russian
paper expressed it, "the retrocession of Kuldja would be an act of
political suicide, for not only would it raise the prestige of China to
a higher point than ever before, but it would also undermine our
position in Eastern Asia, by giving the Chinese a strong military
position within our natural frontier. For these reasons Kuldja cannot be
restored." That paragraph sums up the arguments the Russians will employ
in defence of their continuing to retain possession of Kuldja. They add
something to their effect in the popular mind by diatribes against the
Chinese for rumoured barbarities, by drawing comparisons, flattering to
themselves and to their administrative capacity, between the present
condition of Kuldja, and what it would become under a restored Chinese
rule. In depicting what this would be, they entirely ignore the
prosperous condition of Kuldja before the Tungan revolt, and they appear
to assume that the anarchy existing there, when they entered it in 1871,
was due to the Chinese, instead of being caused by
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