ung Tang and General Kaufmann. The
latest report is that the former has demanded afresh the restoration of
Kuldja; the Russian reply is awaited with eagerness and some anxiety. In
the meanwhile the Chinese have suffered a local reverse of no
significance at the hands of a chief of Khoten, and their power does not
seem to extend south of Yarkand. But they are hurrying up
reinforcements, and 20,000 fresh troops had reached Manas some weeks
ago. They have also an extensive recruiting ground amongst the Calmucks,
and their position of Chuguchak might be of great strategical
importance. If the Kuldja question give rise to a Russo-Chinese war, the
Chinese are sufficiently numerous and sufficiently prepared to task the
capacity of an army of 20,000 Russians; and it is quite certain there
are not 5,000 in Kuldja at present. But the Kuldja question, despite the
prominence it has attained, is only one, if the most important and
pressing, of those questions that are raised and suggested by the
appearance of the Chinese in Central Asia. More especially is this the
case if, as can scarcely be doubted, the Russians refuse to restore
Kuldja; yet the Chinese, knowing the strength of their adversary, shall
hesitate to attack where they cannot but recognize that the penalties of
failure must be immense. In that event the Kuldja question will long
remain unsolved, and for a time perhaps it will be forgotten. But the
Chinese will not forget, nor will they condone the offence. But whatever
may be the interval, and however great the delay, the Kuldja question
will continue to remain a most important portion of Central Asian
politics, and must, so long as it is unsettled, operate in a manner
adverse to the interests of Russia. The Chinese need only maintain their
camps at Chuguchak, Karakaru, Manas, Aksu, Ush Turfan and Kashgar, and
slowly bring up reinforcements from Kansuh and from the Calmuck country,
to render Russia's hold on Kuldja dangerously insecure. In fact, in this
matter the Chinese have the game in their own hands, and can play a
waiting game; whereas Russia can only hope to profit by precipitation on
the part of Tso Tsung Tang. If the Chinese refuse to hold any
intercourse with the faithless Russians, and simply content themselves
with the declaration that they cannot re-enter into political or
commercial relations with them until Kuldja is retroceded, Russia can
never rest tranquil either in Kuldja, Naryn, or Khokand. Above all,