ied to analogy is the application of ordered and classified
knowledge as to the nature of warfare. Aware of the effects which can
be brought about by the weapons at his disposal, the commander
identifies his objective with one or more of these effects.

The application of ordered and classified knowledge of naval warfare
starts, naturally, with a consideration of its objectives, and
proceeds thereafter to the study of the various classes of operations
which may be utilized to this end. Naval effort has as its objective
the keeping open of sea communications (see page 62). Command of the
sea exists for one belligerent when he possesses and can exercise the
ability to move surface traffic, while also being able to prevent the
enemy from doing so.

Naval warfare, therefore, logically includes operations for the
purpose of gaining, maintaining, or disputing command of sea areas,
especially under conditions where freedom of movement and the keeping
open of sea communications are of vital importance.

Such operations may be classified under the headings:

(1) For securing command of sea areas,
(2) In sea areas not under command, and
(3) In sea areas under command.

On the basis of this classification, specific operations, broadly
considered, appear to be limited in number. As to classification (1),
applicable operations are: to destroy the enemy naval forces, to
contain them, or to divert them. For (2), applicable operations are:
to raid, to make war against enemy trade, to attack or defend naval
lines of communication, and to conduct amphibious warfare requiring
overseas movement. For (3), applicable operations are: to blockade
trade, to defend own coastal and critical areas, to safeguard
expeditions against enemy territory, and to carry out offensive
operations against enemy coastal objectives.

Manifestly, each such operation, broadly viewed, may be considered, in
an estimate of the situation, as a course of action. Each such course
of action (or operation) will involve, if developed into a more or
less complete plan of action, numerous detailed operations which
constitute parts of the whole. (See page 37.)

There can be no rigid line of demarcation, always applicable, between
courses of action and the more detailed operations pertaining thereto.
For example, "to raid" may be, in one instance, an operation of such a
character, from the viewpoint of the commander, as to be envisaged,
correlatively with