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y exposition to 'external' reality. But there is also the system of ideal reality in which the room plays its part. Relations of comparison, of classification, serial order, value, also are stubborn, assign a definite place to the room, unlike the incoherence of its places in the mere rhapsody of our successive thoughts. [Cf. above, p. 16.] [16] Note the ambiguity of this term, which is taken sometimes objectively and sometimes subjectively. [17] In the _Psychological Review_ for July [1904], Dr. R. B. Perry has published a view of Consciousness which comes nearer to mine than any other with which I am acquainted. At present, Dr. Perry thinks, every field of experience is so much 'fact.' It becomes 'opinion' or 'thought' only in retrospection, when a fresh experience, thinking the same object, alters and corrects it. But the corrective experience becomes itself in turn corrected, and thus experience as a whole is a process in which what is objective originally forever turns subjective, turns into our apprehension of the object. I strongly recommend Dr. Perry's admirable article to my readers. [18] I have given a partial account of the matter in _Mind_, vol. X, p. 27, 1885 [reprinted in _The Meaning of Truth_, pp. 1-42], and in the _Psychological Review_, vol. II, p. 105, 1895 [partly reprinted in _The Meaning of Truth_, pp. 43-50]. See also C. A. Strong's article in the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_, vol. I, p. 253, May 12, 1904. I hope myself very soon to recur to the matter. [See below, pp. 52 ff.] [19] [Cf. Shadworth Hodgson: _The Metaphysic of Experience_, vol. I. _passim;_ _The Philosophy of Reflection_, bk. II, ch. IV, Sec. 3. ED.] [20] Spencer's proof of his 'Transfigured Realism' (his doctrine that there is an absolutely non-mental reality) comes to mind as a splendid instance of the impossibility of establishing radical heterogeneity between thought and thing. All his painfully accumulated points of difference run gradually into their opposites, and are full of exceptions. [Cf. Spencer: _Principles of Psychology_, part VII, ch. XIX.] [21] I speak here of the complete inner life in which the mind plays freely with its materials. Of course the mind's free play is restricted when it seeks to copy real things in real space. [22] [But there are also "mental activity trains," in which thoughts do "work on each other." Cf. below, p. 184, note. ED.] [23] [This topic is res
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