e _known-as_?
What would it practically result in for _us_, were it true?
It could only result in our orientation, in the turning of our
expectations and practical tendencies into the right path; and the
right path here, so long as we and the object are not yet face to face
(or can never get face to face, as in the case of ejects), would be the
path that led us into the object's nearest neighborhood. Where direct
acquaintance is lacking, 'knowledge about' is the next best thing, and
an acquaintance with what actually lies about the object, and is most
closely related to it, puts such knowledge within our grasp. Ether-waves
and your anger, for example, are things in which my thoughts will never
_perceptually_ terminate, but my concepts of them lead me to their very
brink, to the chromatic fringes and to the hurtful words and deeds which
are their really next effects.
Even if our ideas did in themselves carry the postulated
self-transcendency, it would still remain true that their putting us
into possession of such effects _would be the sole cash-value of the
self-transcendency for us_. And this cash-value, it is needless to say,
is _verbatim et literatim_ what our empiricist account pays in. On
pragmatist principles therefore, a dispute over self-transcendency is a
pure logomachy. Call our concepts of ejective things self-transcendent
or the reverse, it makes no difference, so long as we don't differ about
the nature of that exalted virtue's fruits--fruits for us, of course,
humanistic fruits. If an Absolute were proved to exist for other
reasons, it might well appear that _his_ knowledge is terminated in
innumerable cases where ours is still incomplete. That, however, would
be a fact indifferent to our knowledge. The latter would grow neither
worse nor better, whether we acknowledged such an Absolute or left him
out.
So the notion of a knowledge still _in transitu_ and on its way joins
hands here with that notion of a 'pure experience' which I tried to
explain in my [essay] entitled 'Does Consciousness Exist?' The instant
field of the present is always experience in its 'pure' state, plain
unqualified actuality, a simple _that_, as yet undifferentiated into
thing and thought, and only virtually classifiable as objective fact or
as some one's opinion about fact. This is as true when the field is
conceptual as when it is perceptual. 'Memorial Hall' is 'there' in my
idea as much as when I stand before it. I proceed t
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