The
alterations have been adopted in the present text. This essay is
referred to in _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 280, note 5. ED.]
[26] [Cf. Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Introduction; Hume:
_An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding_, sect. VII, part II
(Selby-Bigge's edition, p. 74); James Mill: _Analysis of the Phenomena
of the Human Mind_, ch. VIII; J. S. Mill: _An Examination of Sir William
Hamilton's Philosophy_, ch. XI, XII; W. K. Clifford: _Lectures and
Essays_, pp. 274 ff.]
[27] [See "The Experience of Activity," below, pp. 155-189.]
[28] The psychology books have of late described the facts here with
approximate adequacy. I may refer to the chapters on 'The Stream of
Thought' and on the Self in my own _Principles of Psychology_, as well
as to S. H. Hodgson's _Metaphysic of Experience_, vol. I, ch. VII and
VIII.
[29] [See "The Thing and its Relations," below, pp. 92-122.]
[30] For brevity's sake I altogether omit mention of the type
constituted by knowledge of the truth of general propositions. This type
has been thoroughly and, so far as I can see, satisfactorily, elucidated
in Dewey's _Studies in Logical Theory_. Such propositions are reducible
to the _S_-is-_P_ form; and the 'terminus' that verifies and fulfils is
the _SP_ in combination. Of course percepts may be involved in the
mediating experiences, or in the 'satisfactoriness' of the _P_ in its
new position.
[31] [See above, pp. 9-15.]
[32] ["On the Function of Cognition," _Mind_, vol. X, 1885, and "The
Knowing of Things Together," _Psychological Review_, vol. II, 1895.
These articles are reprinted, the former in full, the latter in part, in
_The Meaning of Truth_, pp. 1-50. ED.] These articles and their
doctrine, unnoticed apparently by any one else, have lately gained
favorable comment from Professor Strong. ["A Naturalistic Theory of the
Reference of Thought to Reality," _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods_, vol. I, 1904.] Dr. Dickinson S. Miller has
independently thought out the same results ["The Meaning of Truth and
Error," _Philosophical Review_, vol. II, 1893; "The Confusion of
Function and Content in Mental Analysis," _Psychological Review_, vol.
II, 1895], which Strong accordingly dubs the James-Miller theory of
cognition.
[33] [Cf. H. Lotze: _Metaphysik_, Secs. 37-39, 97, 98, 243.]
[34] Mr. Bradley, not professing to know his absolute _aliunde_,
nevertheless derealizes Experience by alle
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