o have made that plausible in this
article. In another article I shall try to make the general notion of a
world composed of pure experiences still more clear.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] [Reprinted from the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods_, vol. I, No. 18, September 1, 1904. For the relation
between this essay and those which follow, cf. below, pp. 53-54. ED.]
[3] Articles by Baldwin, Ward, Bawden, King, Alexander and others. Dr.
Perry is frankly over the border.
[4] [Similarly, there is no "activity of 'consciousness' as such." See
below, pp. 170 ff., note. ED.]
[5] In my _Psychology_ I have tried to show that we need no knower other
than the 'passing thought.' [_Principles of Psychology_, vol. I, pp. 338
ff.]
[6] G. E. Moore: _Mind_, vol. XII, N. S., [1903], p. 450.
[7] Paul Natorp: _Einleitung in die Psychologie_, 1888, pp. 14, 112.
[8] "Figuratively speaking, consciousness may be said to be the one
universal solvent, or menstruum, in which the different concrete kinds
of psychic acts and facts are contained, whether in concealed or in
obvious form." G. T. Ladd: _Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory_,
1894, p. 30.
[9] [For a parallel statement of this view, cf. the author's _Meaning of
Truth_, p. 49, note. Cf. also below, pp. 196-197. ED.]
[10] [For the author's recognition of "concepts as a co-ordinate realm"
of reality, cf. his _Meaning of Truth_, pp. 42, 195, note; _A
Pluralistic Universe_, pp. 339-340; _Some Problems of Philosophy_, pp.
50-57, 67-70; and below, p. 16, note. Giving this view the name 'logical
realism,' he remarks elsewhere that his philosophy "may be regarded as
somewhat eccentric in its attempt to combine logical realism with an
otherwise empiricist mode of thought" (_Some Problems of Philosophy_, p.
106). ED.]
[11] Here as elsewhere the relations are of course _experienced_
relations, members of the same originally chaotic manifold of
non-perceptual experience of which the related terms themselves are
parts. [Cf. below, p. 42.]
[12] Of the representative function of non-perceptual experience as a
whole, I will say a word in a subsequent article: it leads too far into
the general theory of knowledge for much to be said about it in a short
paper like this. [Cf. below, pp. 52 ff.]
[13] Muensterberg: _Grundzuege der Psychologie_, vol. I, p. 48.
[14] Cf. A. L. Hodder: _The Adversaries of the Sceptic_, pp. 94-99.
[15] For simplicity's sake I confine m
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