nted twice over,
just as a perceptual experience does, figuring in one context as an
object or field of objects, in another as a state of mind: and all this
without the least internal self-diremption on its own part into
consciousness and content. It is all consciousness in one taking; and,
in the other, all content.

I find this objectivity of non-perceptual experiences, this complete
parallelism in point of reality between the presently felt and the
remotely thought, so well set forth in a page of Muensterberg's
_Grundzuege_, that I will quote it as it stands.

"I may only think of my objects," says Professor Muensterberg; "yet, in
my living thought they stand before me exactly as perceived objects
would do, no matter how different the two ways of apprehending them may
be in their genesis. The book here lying on the table before me, and the
book in the next room of which I think and which I mean to get, are both
in the same sense given realities for me, realities which I acknowledge
and of which I take account. If you agree that the perceptual object is
not an idea within me, but that percept and thing, as indistinguishably
one, are really experienced _there, outside_, you ought not to believe
that the merely thought-of object is hid away inside of the thinking
subject. The object of which I think, and of whose existence I take
cognizance without letting it now work upon my senses, occupies its
definite place in the outer world as much as does the object which I
directly see."

"What is true of the here and the there, is also true of the now and the
then. I know of the thing which is present and perceived, but I know
also of the thing which yesterday was but is no more, and which I only
remember. Both can determine my present conduct, both are parts of the
reality of which I keep account. It is true that of much of the past I
am uncertain, just as I am uncertain of much of what is present if it be
but dimly perceived. But the interval of time does not in principle
alter my relation to the object, does not transform it from an object
known into a mental state.... The things in the room here which I
survey, and those in my distant home of which I think, the things of
this minute and those of my long-vanished boyhood, influence and decide
me alike, with a reality which my experience of them directly feels.
They both make up my real world, they make it directly, they do not have
first to be introduced to me and mediate