not inside, the single experience
considered, and can always be particularized and defined.

The entering wedge for this more concrete way of understanding the
dualism was fashioned by Locke when he made the word 'idea' stand
indifferently for thing and thought, and by Berkeley when he said that
what common sense means by realities is exactly what the philosopher
means by ideas. Neither Locke nor Berkeley thought his truth out into
perfect clearness, but it seems to me that the conception I am defending
does little more than consistently carry out the 'pragmatic' method
which they were the first to use.

If the reader will take his own experiences, he will see what I mean.
Let him begin with a perceptual experience, the 'presentation,' so
called, of a physical object, his actual field of vision, the room he
sits in, with the book he is reading as its centre; and let him for the
present treat this complex object in the common-sense way as being
'really' what it seems to be, namely, a collection of physical things
cut out from an environing world of other physical things with which
these physical things have actual or potential relations. Now at the
same time it is just _those self-same things_ which his mind, as we say,
perceives; and the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus's time
downwards has been just one long wrangle over the paradox that what is
evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer
space and in a person's mind. 'Representative' theories of perception
avoid the logical paradox, but on the other hand they violate the
reader's sense of life, which knows no intervening mental image but
seems to see the room and the book immediately just as they physically
exist.

The puzzle of how the one identical room can be in two places is at
bottom just the puzzle of how one identical point can be on two lines.
It can, if it be situated at their intersection; and similarly, if the
'pure experience' of the room were a place of intersection of two
processes, which connected it with different groups of associates
respectively, it could be counted twice over, as belonging to either
group, and spoken of loosely as existing in two places, although it
would remain all the time a numerically single thing.

Well, the experience is a member of diverse processes that can be
followed away from it along entirely different lines. The one
self-identical thing has so many relations to the rest of exp