bid._, pp. 77, 81.
[329:8] Plato: _Symposium_, 211. Translation by Jowett.
[330:9] Plato: _Republic_, 533. Translation by Jowett.
[337:10] See Burnet: _Op. cit._, pp. 322-333.
[338:11] Leibniz: _Discourse on Metaphysics_. Translation by Montgomery,
p. 15.
In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends to be
subjectivistic. Cf. Chap. IX.
[340:12] Leibniz: _New Essays on the Human Understanding_. Translation
by Latta, p. 363.
[344:13] Spinoza: _Op. cit._, Part IV. Translation by Elwes, p. 243.
[345:14] Plato: _Op. cit._, 401.
[347:15] Plato: _Symposium_, 210-211. Translation by Jowett.
[348:16] Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: _Thoughts_. Translation by Long, p.
141.
CHAPTER XI
ABSOLUTE IDEALISM[349:1]
[Sidenote: General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism.]
Sect. 171. Absolute idealism is the most elaborately constructive of all
the historical types of philosophy. Though it may have overlooked
elementary truths, and have sought to combine irreconcilable principles,
it cannot be charged with lack of sophistication or subtlety. Its great
virtue is its recognition of problems--its exceeding circumspection;
while its great promise is due to its comprehensiveness--its generous
provision for all interests and points of view. But its very breadth and
complexity render this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivocal use
of conceptions. This may be readily understood from the nature of the
central doctrine of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine it is
proposed to define the universe as an _absolute spirit_; or a being
infinite, ultimate, eternal, and self-sufficient, like the being of
Plato and Spinoza, but possessing at the same time the distinguishing
properties of spirit. Such conceptions as self-consciousness, will,
knowledge, and moral goodness are carried over from the realm of human
endeavor and social relations to the unitary and all-inclusive reality.
Now it has been objected that this procedure is either meaningless, in
that it so applies the term spirit as to contradict its meaning; or
prejudicial to spiritual interests, in that it neutralizes the
properties of spirit through so extending their use. Thus one may
contend that to affirm that the universe as a whole is spirit is
meaningless, since moral goodness requires special conditions and
relations that cannot be attributed to the universe as a whole; or one
may contend that such doctrine is prejudicial
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