orth from Valley Mountain camp, on the turnpike, Anderson and
Donnelson taking their designated routes to the right, the former
passing to the head of Becky's Run, thence through the mountains
to a position on the road in the rear of Cheat Summit camp, arriving
at daylight of the 12th of September. Donnelson, by another path
nearer the road which the principal column under Loring pursued,
marched to Stuart's Run, then down it to the Simmons house, where,
on the 11th, it captured Captain Bense and about sixty men of the
6th Ohio, who were in an exposed position and had not been vigilant.
Donnelson then marched to Becky's Run and to a point where, from
a nearby elevation, he could see the Union camp at Elk Water, and
he was to the eastward of it and partially in its rear. Here, with
his command, he remained for the night. General Lee followed and
joined Donnelson in the early morning of the 12th, and together
they advanced to Andrew Crouch's house, within a mile of Elk Water
camp and fairly in its rear. Lee, however, ordered Donnelson to
retire his column to Becky's Run at the Rosecrans house. Neither
Rust, Anderson, nor Donnelson, though each led a column into the
region between the Elk Water and Cheat Mountain camps (distant
apart through the mountains about six miles) seemed, at the critical
time, to know where the others were, or what they were doing. The
presence of Lee with Donnelson on the morning of the 12th did not
materially improve the conditions in this respect. Donnelson,
before Lee's arrival, contemplated an attack on a body of what he
supposed a thousand men (the detachments of the 9th and 23d Ohio)
camped in rear of the main Union camp and near Jacob Crouch's house.
Colonel Savage of the 16th Tennessee advised against the attempt,
and Lee, on his arrival, must have regarded it as too hazardous.
Lee wrote Governor Letcher five days later that "it was a tempting
sight" to see our tents on Valley River.
Loring, with the principal command, accompanied by all the artillery,
forced the Union pickets back to the mouth of Elk Water, where he
encountered resistance from a strong grand-guard and the pickets.
Here some shots both of infantry and artillery were exchanged, but
with little result.
It is due to the truth of history to say that none of the movements
of Lee's army were known or anticipated by Reynolds and his officers,
and whatever was done to prevent its success was without previous
plan or me
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