ireless from the
Admiralty plainly intended for the _Lusitania_, informing him that
submarines (plural) were active in the southern part of the Irish
Channel and when last heard of were twenty miles south of Coningbeg
Light Vessel. This wireless message presented acutely to the Captain
the problem as to the best course to pursue, always bearing in mind his
determination and the desirability of getting to the Liverpool Bar when
it could be crossed while the tide served and without a pilot. Further,
as was stated by Sir Alfred Booth, "The one definite instruction we did
give him with regard to that was to authorize him to come up without a
pilot." The reasons for this instruction were cogent and were concisely
summed up by Sir Alfred Booth during his examination as a witness as
follows:

[Sidenote: The Mersey sandbar.]

"It was one of the points that we felt it necessary to make the Captain
of the _Lusitania_ understand the importance of. The _Lusitania_ can
only cross the Liverpool Bar at certain states of the tide, and we
therefore warned the Captain, or whoever might be Captain, that we did
not think it would be safe for him to arrive off the bar at such a time
that he would have to wait there, because that area had been infested
with submarines, and we thought therefore it would be wiser for him to
arrange his arrival in such a way, leaving him an absolutely free hand
as to how he would do it, that he could come straight up without
stopping at all. The one definite instruction we did give him with
regard to that was to authorize him to come up without a pilot."

The tide would be high at Liverpool Bar at 6:53 on Saturday morning, May
8. Captain Turner planned to cross the bar as much earlier than that as
he could get over without stopping, while at the same time figuring on
passing during the darkness the dangerous waters from the entrance of
St. George's Channel to the Liverpool Bar.

[Sidenote: The Captain decides to work inshore.]

Having thus in mind his objective, and the time approximately when he
intended to reach it, the message received at 11:25 A. M. required that
he should determine whether to keep off land approximately the same
distance as he was when he passed Fastnet, or to work inshore and go
close to Coningbeg Lightship. He determined that the latter was the
better plan to avoid the submarines reported in midchannel ahead of him.

[Sidenote: Taking a bearing.]

When Galley Head was sighted the