at the
same time, it was the accepted doctrine of all civilized nations (as
will be more fully considered infra) that, as Lord Mersey put it, "there
is always an obligation first to secure the safety of the lives of those
on board."

The responsibility, therefore, of Captain Turner, in his task of
bringing the ship safely to port, was to give heed not only to general
advices advanced as the outcome of experience in the then developing
knowledge as to submarine warfare, but particularly to any special
information which might come to him in the course of the voyage.

[Sidenote: Advices of the Admiralty.]

Realizing that if there was a due warning, in accordance with
international law, and an opportunity, within a limited time, for the
passengers to leave the ship, nevertheless that the operation must be
quickly done, Captain Turner, on May 6, had taken the full precautions,
such as swinging out the boats, properly provisioned, which have been
heretofore described. The principal features of the Admiralty advices
were (1) to give the headlands a wide berth; (2) to steer a midchannel
course; (3) to maintain as high a speed as practicable; (4) to zigzag,
and (5) to make ports, if possible, at dawn, thus running the last part
of the voyage at night.

[Sidenote: Fastnet given a wide berth.]

The reason for the advice as to keeping off headlands was that the
submarines lurked near those prominent headlands and landfalls to and
from which ships were likely to go. This instruction Captain Turner
entirely followed in respect of Fastnet, which was the first point on
the Irish coast which a vessel bound from New York to Liverpool would
ordinarily approach closely, and, in normal times, the passing would be
very near, or even inside of Fastnet. The _Lusitania_ passed Fastnet so
far out that Captain Turner could not see it. Whether the distance was
about twenty-five miles, as the Cunard Steamship Co. contends, or about
eighteen and one-half miles, as the claimants calculate, the result is
that either distance must be regarded as a wide berth, in comparison
with the customary navigation at that point, and, besides, nothing
happened there. At 8:30 P. M. on May 6 the message had been received
from the British Admiralty that submarines were off Fastnet, so that
Captain Turner, in this regard, not only followed the general advices,
but the specific information from the Admiralty.

At 11:25 A. M. on May 7 Captain Turner received the w