ccordingly
made to abandon the enterprise. How these plans were carried out is told
in the chapter following.

GALLIPOLI ABANDONED

GENERAL SIR CHARLES C. MONRO

On October 20, 1915, in London, I received instructions to proceed as
soon as possible to the Near East and take over the command of the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

[Sidenote: General Monro's orders on arrival.]

My duty on arrival was in broad outline:

(a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

(b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the
Peninsula should be evacuated or another attempt made to carry it.

(c) The number of troops that would be required--

(1) To carry the Peninsula.

(2) To keep the strait open, and

(3) To take Constantinople.

[Sidenote: Military defects in positions occupied.]

The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation
unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured.
The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in
personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery
fire. Our intrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks.
The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The
force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect.
The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and
dependent on the weather.

No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops
destined for the offensive--while the Turks enjoyed full powers of
observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the
time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented
by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer.

[Sidenote: Disease, loss of competent officers, make-shift
organization.]

Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the
Peninsula had suffered much from various causes--exposure to shell fire,
disease, the dearth of competent officers owing to earlier losses, and
"make-shifts" due to the attachment of Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades to
the Territorial Divisions. Other arguments, irrefutable in their
conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise
course to pursue.

[Sidenote: Consequences of unusual storms.]

On November 21, 1915 the Peninsula was visited by a storm said to be
nearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The