vided only two out of the six
battalions that it promised in August would join American forces in
Baghdad. The Iraqi government has rejected sustained security
operations in Sadr City.

Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both the capability
to hold areas that have been cleared and the will to clear
neighborhoods that are home to Shiite militias. U.S. forces can
"clear" any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U.S. troops
present nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to "hold"
neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq.
Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and Iraqi military
forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the
sectarian violence, U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that
has no foreseeable end.

2. Politics

Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council of
Representatives. A government of national unity was formed in May 2006
that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people. Iraq has ratified
a constitution, and--per agreement with Sunni Arab leaders--has
initiated a process of review to determine if the constitution needs
amendment.

The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and
key players within the government too often act in their sectarian
interest. Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to
demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's national interest, and
too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The
result is an even weaker central government than the constitution
provides.

There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international agreement on
the key issues confronting the Iraqi government: national
reconciliation, including the negotiation of a "political deal" among
Iraq's sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-Baathification, oil
revenue sharing, provincial elections, the future of Kirkuk, and
amnesty; security, particularly curbing militias and reducing the
violence in Baghdad; and governance, including the provision of basic
services and the rollback of pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi
leaders view issues through a sectarian prism, we will summarize the
differing perspectives of Iraq's main sectarian groups.

Sectarian Viewpoints

The Shia, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power for the
first time in more than 1,300 years. Above all, many Shia are
interested in preserving that power.