ower within the government). Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he
will address the problem of militias, he has taken little meaningful
action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to
Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi
Army.

Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent
insurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni politicians within
the government have a limited level of support and influence among
their own population, and questionable influence over the insurgency.
Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation against Sunni
leaders--assassinating the family members of those who do participate in
the government. Too often, insurgents tolerate and cooperate with al
Qaeda, as they share a mutual interest in attacking U.S. and Shia
forces. However, Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently
took the positive step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreign
fighters in their midst, and have started to take action on those
commitments.

Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take on the
militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has to help
them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each side watches the
other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shia
militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni
insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: there are many armed groups
within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms.

GOVERNANCE. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its
people with basic services: electricity, drinking water, sewage,
health care, and education. In many sectors, production is below or
hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and other unstable areas, the
situation is much worse. There are five major reasons for this
problem.

First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian
basis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of Shia-governed
Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity each day and
trash piles are waist-high. One American official told us that Baghdad
is run like a "Shia dictatorship" because Sunnis boycotted provincial
elections in 2005, and therefore are not represented in local
government.

Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. For
instance, electricity transmission towers are downed by explosives,
and then sniper attacks prevent repairs from being made.

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