adverse consequences outlined above. The near-term results would be a
significant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional
destabilization, and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda would
depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraq
descends into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually
require the United States to return.
2. Staying the Course
Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq
is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation.
Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at
a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United
States is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other
international crises is constrained. A majority of the American people
are soured on the war. This level of expense is not sustainable over
an extended period, especially when progress is not being made. The
longer the United States remains in Iraq without progress, the more
resentment will grow among Iraqis who believe they are subjects of a
repressive American occupation. As one U.S. official said to us, "Our
leaving would make it worse. . . . The current approach without
modification will not make it better."
3. More Troops for Iraq
Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the
fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of
national reconciliation. A senior American general told us that adding
U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a highly
localized area. However, past experience indicates that the violence
would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved to another
area. As another American general told us, if the Iraqi government
does not make political progress, "all the troops in the world will
not provide security." Meanwhile, America's military capacity is
stretched thin: we do not have the troops or equipment to make a
substantial, sustained increase in our troop presence. Increased
deployments to Iraq would also necessarily hamper our ability to
provide adequate resources for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond
to crises around the world.
4. Devolution to Three Regions
The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous
regions with loose central control would be too high. Because Iraq's
population is not neatly separated, regional boundaries cannot be easily
drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces ha
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